The state of Sinaloa is located in northwest
Mexico. It has a long coastline on the Pacific coast and on the Sea of Cortez (Gulf
of California). Its border to the east is with Durango and Chihuahua, along the
Sierra Madre Occidental. Sinaloa’s population is about three million, and
includes the capital Culiacán and the port and tourist city of Mazatlán.
Sinaloa is also well-known as the home of
the Sinaloa Cartel (also known as the Pacific Cartel), and its erstwhile leader
Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, who is now in US custody. The cartel is
emerging from a period of instability. El Chapo’s two sons have made peace with
El Chapo’s elderly partner, the semi-retired Ismael "El Mayo"Zambada, and have successfully pushed aside El Chapo’s godson, Dámaso López
Núñez (“Licenciado”), who was captured by police on May 2, 2017.
The result is that, despite some setbacks,
the Sinaloa Cartel is thriving and still considered one the largest criminal
organizations in the world, though there is ongoing conflict – both with federal
government forces and with other criminal organizations. Nonetheless, The Sinaloa Cartel has
lost some control over street-level criminal activity in Culiacan and Mazatlán, as well as in some villages in the
countryside.
The Sinaloa cartel appears to be taking the
fight to the remnants of the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel and its henchmen Los
Mazatlecos. This is most evident directly south of Sinaloa in Nayarit, where
the “plaza” (territory) is also being contested by Sinaloa’s main rival, the
Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).
Sinaloa’s state governments, whether from
the National Action Party (PAN) or
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), have been accused of giving the Sinaloa Cartel
favourable treatment. Similar suspicions have applied on the federal level to
the National Action Party (PAN) presidency of Felipe Calderón (2016-2012), who
initiated the militarization of the drug war, and to the early days of the PRI government of Enrique Peña Nieto
(2012-2018).
The rationale for this theory is that the Sinaloa Cartel was a
stabilizing force, focusing almost exclusively on drug trafficking, whereas Los
Zetas and the CJNG were ultraviolent and actively engaged in human trafficking,
extortion, and petroleum theft. However, now that Los Zetas are less of a
threat, federal forces appear to be giving more attention to the Sinaloa
Cartel.
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| The poll for federal senate candidates |
Historically, the political landscape in
Sinaloa has been dominated by the PAN and the PRI. The current PRI governor, Quirino
Ordaz Coppel, is from Mazatlán,
where he owns the Océano Palace and Luna Palace hotels. Of the three federal
senators from Sinaloa, two are from the PRI, and one is from the right of
center PAN.
Corruption in Sinaloa has functioned
differently than in other states, due to the entrenched influence of the
Sinaloa Cartel. Unlike elsewhere in Mexico, the influence of drug cartels on
the state government is less a cause for outrage than accepted as a fact of
life. Given the corruption and incompetence of the police, both at the state
and the municipal level, the Sinaloa Cartel was often credited with maintaining
street-level law and order. This involved everything from strict controls on
extortion rackets, to an overall policing of delinquency and protection of
tourist zones. Part of the rationale for maintaining tourism is that Mazatlán's hotel industry is a
vital resource for money laundering.
As a result, accusations that the former
PAN governor Mario López Valdez (known as “Malova”), has had close connections with
the Sinaloa Cartel, or that other politicians have engaged in
the all-too-common practice of washing drug money through hotels, has been
met with resignation. In Sinaloa, these types of accusations are never
investigated.
Which is one reason why being a journalist
in Sinaloa is one of either two things: deadly boring, or plain deadly. The
newspapers in Sinaloa have for years functioned under the watchful eye of the
Sinaloa Cartel, and are skilled at self-censorship, usually reporting on crime
without providing any context or analysis.
Something went terribly wrong, however, when
the well-known Sinaloa journalist Javier Valdez Cárdenas was murdered in
Culiacán on May 15, 2017. Valdez, a 2011 recipient of the Committee to
Protect Journalists International Press Freedom Award, was one of the founders
of the weekly Ríodoce, as well as being a local correspondent for the national
paper La Jornada.
His death was shocking, as he was a
seasoned reporter who had successfully navigated the pitfalls of reporting in
Sinaloa for many years. He was known as much for his empathetic portrayal of
the victims of crime, and of cartel culture, as for his independent journalism.
Valdéz was also skilled at judicious self-censorship. He was not on a suicide
mission.
However, before his death Valdez conducted
a telephone interview with Dámaso “El Licenciado” López Nuñez, the leader of the Dámasos gang – the splinter cell that was then fighting for control of the Sinaloa Cartel
against El Chapo’s sons. The interview was published in Ríodoce in February,
2017. It’s believed that the interview, or perhaps another report, drove the Dámasos gang to kill Valdez.
At this point the gang
is not much of a threat to El Chapo’s sons, given that López Nuñez
is now in custody in Mexico awaiting extradition to the US. As well, his son Dámaso “El Mini Lic” López Serrano is in jail
in California.
There has been some progress on the case. The alleged killer, a 26-year-old named Heriberto “El Koala” Picos Barraza, was
arrested in Tijuana, Baja California, on April 19 of this year.
Another suspect, Juan Francisco Picos Barrueto, “El Quillo,” has also been
arraigned as an accomplice. A third suspect, Luis Idelfonso Sánchez Romero, also
known as "Diablo," was murdered in Sonora in September, 2017.
The Valdez case should also be considered in the overall context of press freedom in Sinaloa. The state has always been a dangerous place to be a reporter: from the late 19th century until the beginning of the modern drug war in December, 2006, an estimated 19 journalists have been killed, with the worst decade being the 1980s, when 9 journalists were murdered. By comparison, in the 12 years since the beginning of the drug war ten journalists have been killed.
The Valdez case should also be considered in the overall context of press freedom in Sinaloa. The state has always been a dangerous place to be a reporter: from the late 19th century until the beginning of the modern drug war in December, 2006, an estimated 19 journalists have been killed, with the worst decade being the 1980s, when 9 journalists were murdered. By comparison, in the 12 years since the beginning of the drug war ten journalists have been killed.
Thing may improve now that the intense conflict within the Sinaloa
Cartel appears to have been resolved, but with the leadership fractured and at war,
some control was lost on the ground, and that remains true to this day. For
example, pipeline theft has now become commonplace. In Sinaloa this year the
state oil company Pemex is finding on average three new illegal pipeline taps
on its pipelines per day.
This is more likely the work of local gangs
than the Sinaloa Cartel, and has resulted in a significant increase in violence
in Culiacán and the town of Mocorito, about 120 kilometers to the north,
including shootouts, kidnappings, and arson. Authorities have asked the
populace not to buy stolen fuel, but, as is so often the case in Mexico, many
average citizens and even businesses appear to be disconnected from the
consequences of supporting criminal and corrupt practices.
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| AMLO campaigning in Culiacán |
There is some good news in Sinaloa. The
tourism sector has been unaffected by the violence, and in late March Governor
Ordaz Coppel announced a new 120-bed hospital in Culiacán. As well, the
all-important agricultural sector is doing well, despite issues with machinery
theft, and there’s a good chance that approval will come this year to export sorghum
to China.
On the political front, there are three federal senate seats open in Sinaloa for the July 1 election. Based on the most
recent poll for one slate of candidates, Ruben Mocha Roya of the Morena and Workers Party coalition leads
with 45%, followed by Hector Melesio Cuén Ojeada of the PAN-PRD alliance with
35%, and Mario Zamora Gastelum of the PRI-led coalition with New Alliance and
the Greens with 20%.
The polling for the Sinaloa senate seat is
remarkably similar to the national support for the three major candidates. As a
result, it’s likely that in Sinaloa the presidential vote will follow a similar
pattern, with Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) from Morena receiving a strong
plurality, followed Ricardo Anaya of the PAN-PRD, with the PRI’s José Antonio Meade bringing up the rear.
Below are the links to the posts for each state:
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